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Recalcitrant Creditors Against Debtor
Nations, or How to Play Darts
Theodore Allegaert*
During the last decade and a half, the international finan-
cial system has had to cope with intermittent debt crises result-
ing from the over-extension of credit by Western banks and
governments to less developed countries (LDCs).1 Among many
related developments during this time has been the advent and
growth of a secondary market for sovereign debt, a market in
which tranches of debt and related instruments are traded by
and among financial institutions and others, usually at steep
discounts from par or face value. The evolution of this market
was a natural consequence of increases in the 1970s of private
sector financing of sovereign debt and of the defaults and
restructurings that followed. As in any "secondary" market, the
sellers are often parties to original or primary transactions,
seeking to cut losses and exit the market. Secondary buyers of
sovereign debt instruments, on the other hand, tend to be specu-
lators: they purchase the rights of the selling party hoping that
the market's estimation of the likelihood of performance will rise
over time and/or the debtor will actually perform to some extent
beyond the discounted price paid.
The secondary purchasers of sovereign debt, who as a prac-
tical matter rarely acquire more than a small fraction of a coun-
try's total external debt,2 are generally bound to the terms of the
debt instruments in the same manner as the contracting parties.
* J.D. 1996, The University of Chicago. Law Clerk, United States Dis-
trict Court, Eastern District of Wisconsin, 1996-97. I thank Professors Kenneth
Dam and Geoffrey Miller for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. This shorthand denotes a broader category than that of non-oil produc-
ing developing countries (NDOCs); because the debtor nations I refer to in this
paper will in most cases be NDOCs, but not always, LDC is used here.
2. See, e.g., Kenneth N. Gilpin, Darts Clash with Brazil over Loans, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1993, at 37 (reporting that the Dart family, who bought an un-
usually large amount of Brazilian debt, held $1.4 billion of a $43.5 billion pack-
age of outstanding debt, which Brazil and other creditors sought to
restructure); see also CIBC Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd. v. Banco
Central do Brasil, 886 F. Supp. 1105, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (ensuing action
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
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Such terms typically include an undertaking to deal with other
creditors in good faith, a clause requiring that all creditors be
treated in pari passu and/or share any repayments pro-rata with
other creditors, and sometimes a commitment to participate in
any restructuring that a majority or super-majority of creditor
banks may vote to implement. Interesting questions are raised,
however, where the relevant agreement lacks this last ingredi-
ent, where the requisite majority is not reached, or where the
agreement is ambiguous. In such cases dissenting creditors may
feel no obligation to follow the lead of the major Western banks
in negotiations to restructure sovereign commercial loans.3 The
purchasing bank might, for example, have a legitimate gripe
about its treatment at the hands of the debtor and the large
banks that negotiated the terms of a particular restructuring. 4
In another case, however, the purchaser might be a Cayman Is-
lands "bank" that champertously bought with the intention of
suing on its modest sub-tranche (which may happen to equal in
value attachable commercial assets of the debtor country pres-
ent in the forum of the lawsuit) and then dissolving without
sharing the proceeds with other creditor banks. Can either or
both sue on the debt in the face of an intervening restructuring?
Can a court find a principled way of discerning between the le-
gitimate complaint and the wholly speculative nuisance suit?
Should a court even try?
This article examines the question of how a U.S. court
should respond to an action by a secondary purchaser of LDC
sovereign debt to enforce the obligation in toto. While this arti-
cle seeks to answer the question for the United States (which is
the forum most commonly specified in LDC loan agreements for
litigation arising thereunder), the issues and arguments
presented are for the most part applicable to similar suits in
other IMF member nations, such as the United Kingdom. As
will be discussed, the filing of such lawsuits typically constitutes
an attempt by the purchaser to avoid acceding to debt restruc-
turings which are either sought by the debtor or are already in
place. Section I presents an overview of commercial sovereign
loans, restructurings thereof, and describes U.S. policies in this
area. Section II discusses the mechanics of the secondary mar-
3. See James B. Hurlock, Advising Sovereign Clients on the Renegotiation
of Their External Indebtedness, 23 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 29, 39 (1984).
4. Gilpin, supra note 2, at 37 ("The dispute, which has Citibank and sev-
eral other big banks caught in the middle, centers on... loans... that Brazil
*.. and its major commercial bank creditors have been painstakingly working
to restructure .... ").
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ket for sovereign debt instruments and lawsuits by malcontent
commercial purchasers in that market against LDCs, citing the
well-publicized lawsuit by the Dart family against Brazil, among
others. Section II posits that to permit such lawsuits to go for-
ward presents a significant opportunity for abuse by unscrupu-
lous plaintiffs and their lawyers, leading in turn to disruption in
the efforts of less developed nations to renegotiate and restruc-
ture their international obligations in an orderly and consensual
manner, the countering of which requires a critical re-
evaluation of existing law. Section III examines The Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund5 ("the Fund
Agreement," also known as the Bretton Woods Treaty), focusing
specifically on interpretive difficulties that courts, commentators
and the IMF have faced in applying the treaty to legal problems.
Finally, Section IV argues that in order to counter nuisance
suits in the sovereign debt context, the Bretton Woods Treaty
should be read to bar a court from decreeing performance of sov-
ereign debt obligations anytime the IMF is substantially in-
volved in the affairs of the debtor nation. Section IV focuses on
the different interpretations that courts and commentators have
given to Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement and
argues that this provision should, in certain circumstances, con-
stitute a bar to the plaintiff who would challenge a debtor nation
in court in the United States or another IMF member nation.
First, because the debtor nation's exchange resources are di-
rectly affected by the performance of sovereign debt obligations,
courts should consider such agreements to be "exchange con-
tracts which involve the currency of' the debtor IMF member
within the meaning of Article VIII, section 2(b). Second, a deci-
sion to restructure external debt, if taken with the involvement
and approval of the IMF, should be deemed "exchange control
regulations imposed... consistently with" the Fund Agreement.
As elaborated in Section IV, this interpretation enables IMF-ap-
proved restructuring-cum-exchange-control-regulation to render
pre-existing loans-cum-exchange-contracts unenforceable in
court. This is because the latter (so characterized) are "con-
trary" to the former and are thus declared unenforceable by Ar-
ticle VIII, section 2(b). In these circumstances, and only these
circumstances, dismissal of an enforcement action should follow.
The interpretation of the treaty proposed in Section IV is
supported by ample authority and is a legitimate avenue
5. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27,
1945, 60 Stat. 1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter Fund Agreement].
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through which judges in the United States and other IMF mem-
ber nations may render IMF-approved restructurings immune
from collateral attack by minority creditors, a result which
makes economic sense and which accords with evolving U.S. pol-
icies in this field. At the same time, however, the proposed in-
terpretation and application of the Bretton Woods Treaty would
leave in place the possibility of suits, including strike suits by
speculative secondary purchasers. These suits may arise in any
case where the debtor country has chosen for political or selfish
reasons to "go it alone" with the help of its commercial creditors,
whether by unwisely seeking to stay current in existing obliga-
tions through still more private borrowing or by pursuing other
policies which the IMF would not sanction.6 Section IV con-
cludes that such a framework will give debtor nations a signifi-
cant incentive to seek out the involvement of the IMF at earlier
stages in the management of external debt problems than has
historically been the case. I posit that this will promote the
IMF's "firm supervisory" role in these matters, a role preferable
to others it might play, including that of a world bankruptcy
court.
7
6. Russia, for example, entered the international bond market in October
1996 with a $500 million global issue just as the IMF was withholding addi-
tional lending due to Russia's inability to meet its budget deficit target and its
failure to reschedule other debt. See, e.g., Carl Gewirtz, From Russia, New
Level of Debt, INT'L HERALD TRm., Nov. 18, 1996, at 14. Under the framework
advanced here, such circumstances would entitle a holder of pre-existing Rus-
sian debt to refuse to accede to any proposed restructuring and to enforce the
debt it owns in accordance with its original terms. Such a possibility would
continue until the IMF re-endorses the economic policies of the debtor nation,
which was exactly what happened to Russia a month later: Moscow took steps
to stem corruption in its tax collection processes, and the IMF resumed dis-
bursement of a multi-billion dollar loan. See Michael R. Gordon, I.M.F. Re-
sumes Paying Credit of $10.1 Billion to Russians, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 1996, at
A6. Now, any Russian restructuring of extant loans should be deemed "consis-
tent with" the Bretton Woods Treaty (i.e., consistent with the IMFs views),
which in turn renders original loans unenforceable in the court of any other
IMF member nation.
7. See, e.g., Bob Davis, G-7 Summit Expected to Boost Support For Propos-
als to Help Insolvent Nations, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1995, at A4 ("Under the
bankruptcy plan [advocated by Professor Sachs, among others], the IMF would
be authorized to halt debt payments from bankrupt nations, oversee new bor-
rowing from the private market[,] approve a plan to pay off creditors... [and]
could get out of the loan business altogether .... But the bankruptcy plan has
big problems. Nations would have to be willing to surrender sovereign rights to
the IMF."). See generally Note, Procedural Guidelines for Renegotiating LDC
Debt: An Analogy to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 VA. J.
INTVL L. 305 (1981).
CREDIToRS AND DEBTOR NATIONS
I. OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL LENDING TO
SOVEREIGN STATES
A. HISTORICAL SUMMARY
Between World War II and the 1970's, the Bretton Woods
System provided the framework for sovereign borrowing by de-
veloping countries. Under Bretton Woods, the IMF provided ac-
cess to credit to allow developing countries to smooth over short
term economic difficulties. The World Bank also provided fund-
ing for major development and infrastructure projects, and
Western governments ("the Paris Club" led by the United
States) provided funding for specific projects.8 Under this ar-
rangement, the credits extended to LDCs generally came with
strings attached, and the amounts of funding available were
limited. The IMF, for example, limited lending according to a
formula derived from each member's quota (the annual sum
paid into the Fund by members) and came increasingly to be
guided by a policy of "conditionality."9 The IMF would insist
that borrowing countries implement measures to reduce trade
imbalances, restrain domestic demand, limit public sector ex-
penditures, and take other actions aimed at strengthening the
financial positions of debtor nations.10 For many years, the
Bretton Woods System, with its emphasis on fixed exchange
rates, worked tolerably well. In addition, because the setup was
characterized by a structural bias in favor of under-lending, it
provided a salutary check on LDCs' ever-increasing appetite for
Western capital. 1
In the 1960's, the Bretton Woods System began to weaken
as the United States, with payment imbalances of its own, could
no longer afford to maintain the par value currency system or
the obligations the system placed on it as guarantor of world
currency stability.' 2 Once fixed exchange rates were jettisoned
8. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Les Jeux Sont Faits: Structural Ori-
gins of the International Debt Problem, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 330 (1985).
9. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 223
(2d ed. 1984).
10. Id.
11. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 330.
12. Id.; see also Joseph Gold, Transformations of the International Mone-
tary Fund, 20 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 227, 229 (1981). When the United
States negotiated the Bretton Woods Treaty and undertook to buy and sell gold
freely at $35 per ounce, it did so on the assumption that it would face a balance
of payments surplus for the foreseeable future. Id. (attributing the failure of
the par value system to its having imposed rigidity without fostering stability,
precisely the opposite of what was intended).
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in 1971, and the par value system formally met its demise in the
1977 Amendments to the IMF Articles of Agreement,13 the
IMF's approval of par value changes was no longer a relevant
feature of the international financial system. As a result, coun-
tries were more free to maintain overvalued currencies and pay-
ment deficits. LDCs, in turn, sought ever larger foreign loans to
finance these arrangements. 14
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, these developments were
accelerated by the failure of official international lenders to in-
crease their available funds in step with inflation. Thus, while
the IMF's contribution quotas for member states increased in
absolute terms, the purchasing power of the Fund's assets de-
clined overall in the face of inflation. There was also an unprec-
edented growth in the private banking system, fueled by
increasing streams of petrodollar deposits by OPEC members,
particularly at the offshore branches of U.S. banks.15 The oil
shocks of 1973 and 1979 increased the infusion of oil profits into
the deposit accounts of Western banks, just as high oil prices
were causing the economies of LDCs to recede. The end result
was that LDCs needed and wanted to import unprecedented
amounts of borrowed capital to sustain their ideology of
growth.' 6 Western banks, overflowing with petrodollars, were
all too ready to lend to them. 17 The ready money of the Western
banks, which generally came with no conditions attached,
caused LDC governments to view conditioned aid from the IMF
(and Paris Club lending conditioned on IMF involvement) as an
unattractive and increasingly unnecessary option.
Thus, as Professor Lowenfeld notes, by 1976 almost half of
the financing sought by LDCs came from private banks, up from
13. Joseph Gold, Book Review, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 729, 733 (1984).
14. THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 2-4 (Tamir
Agmon et al. eds., 1984).
15. These branches were opened in the face of U.S. regulation of foreign
borrowing and investment through such devices as the Interest Equalization
Tax of 1964, the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program of 1965, and other mis-
guided efforts to limit overseas lending by U.S. banks and ameliorate balance of
payments problems. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 331. These regulations
spawned the eurodollar market, which permitted dollar-denominated deposits
to be kept abroad and re-lent without being subject to minimum reserve or
other U.S. banking regulations. The eurodollar market, in turn, may have has-
tened the demise of the Bretton Woods system. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE
RULES OF THE GAME 186 (1982).
16. MICHAEL MOFFITT, THE WORLD'S MONEY: INTERNATIONAL BANIONG
FROM BRETrON WOODS TO THE BRINK OF INSOLVENCY 95-106 (1983).
17. Id. at 55-65.
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a third only three years earlier.' 8 That proportion continued to
increase as OPEC deposits fostered a "bank lending rush."19 By
1980, 70 per cent of total sovereign lending came from private
banks.20 Moreover, increased exports from LDCs, between the
oil shocks at least, partially offset growth in their external debt,
making the LDCs' situation appear more tenable than was actu-
ally the case. 21 The lending trend, described by some commen-
tators as a "mania,"22 continued until Mexico defaulted on its
external debt in 1982. This triggered a debt crisis, with other
Latin American countries such as Argentina and Brazil headed
toward default. Since then, many LDC borrowers have had to
restructure their external debts repeatedly, often with the IMF,
the Bank for International Settlements, the United States, and
other G-10 governments assisting with a range of palliatives
(such as Brady reorganizations, discussed below).
To summarize, and reduce an avalanche of scholarly litera-
ture to a sound bite, commentators seem in accord that the debt
crisis was caused by a mixture of (1) oil shocks, (2) a supply-side
glut of deposit money in Western banks, (3) an ideology of
growth on the part of LDCs, (4) a tendency of LDCs and Western
banks to respond to capital shortages in LDCs with "new money"
lending rather than suspension of payments or default, (5) poor
policy responses by LDCs from 1979-82 (taken in lieu of IMF-
imposed rationality), (6) and inadequate domestic U.S. regula-
tion of foreign lending.23 For present purposes, the removal of
the IMF from the LDC management loop is most significant. It
seems that in the formative stages of the Latin American debt
crisis, the instincts of the players in the global money market
were to prod debtor countries to devise some corrective fiscal and
economic policies, but otherwise to let LDCs muddle through
without taking on harsher, politically hard-to-swallow IMF pre-
18. LOWENFELD, supra note 9, at 223.
19. Id. at 230.
20. A Nightmare of Debt: A Survey of International Banking, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 20, 1982, at 99.
21. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 342.
22. Id.
23. Not until 1983 did Congress respond with the International Lending
Supervision Act. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-12 (1994) [hereinafter ILSA]. Professor
Lichtenstein suggested that, prior to ILSA, the policy of the United States and
other Western governments was one of benign neglect, underpinned by a belief
that increasing private sector lending would enhance export markets. Also, it
seemed a reasonable assumption that bank regulators shared the bankers' view
that sovereign nations "just don't go broke." See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, The
U.S. Response to the International Debt Crisis: The International Lending Su-
pervision Act of 1983, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 401, 402 (1985).
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scriptions. 24 These inclinations produced disastrous results. In
1983, when private banks agreed to a package of new lending to
Brazil and a rescheduling of existing loans on the condition that
Brazil follow the IMF's program, Brazil was in such a bad state
that compliance was politically impossible.25 In the wake of that
example and others, the inescapable conclusion was that future
efforts should be made to ensure consultation with the IMF and
implementation of its policies before borrower countries reach
the crisis stage.26 The framework proposed in this paper is in-
tended to cause LDCs to do just that, or risk the embarrassment
of having portions of their existing sovereign obligations en-
forced by speculative secondary purchasers in the courts of other
nations.
B. RESTRUCTURINGS
In the wake of the Latin American debt crisis came a series
of restructurings of the sovereign debts of developing countries,
followed in many cases by restructurings of the restructurings,
and much hand-wringing about how best to handle the problem
of private LDC debt.27 The players in this continuing saga in-
clude the debtor LDCs, Western banks (the London Club), the
governments of creditor nations (the Paris Club) and multi-lat-
eral organizations such as the IMF, the Bank for International
Settlements, and the World Bank.28 A variety of methods have
been devised to stanch the trauma, most notably the "Brady
Plan," devised in 1989 by Nicholas Brady when he was Secre-
tary of the Treasury, and they have met with varying degrees of
success. In broad overview these methods involve an admixture
of debt forgiveness, drawing out of payment schedules, the issu-
ance of long-maturity bonds, swaps of debt for equity in newly
privatized state industries, and other means of balancing the
limited ability of debtor nations to service external debt with the
24. LOWENFELD, supra note 9, at 307 ("[T]he perception that fimd condi-
tionality is too severe, both in its performance targets and in its intrusiveness
over domestic policies and priorities,.. . led Mexico, Brazil, and the others to
approach the Fund only in extremis, when the political risk to the officials from
doing so was clearly outweighed by the risks of all the alternatives.").
25. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 306.
26. See, e.g., E. Walter Robichek, The International Monetary Fund: An Ar-
biter in the Debt Restructuring Process, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143, 148
(1984) ("[E]xperts and observers have been searching for ways of dealing with
this tardiness on the part of both creditors and debtors, many of them calling
for an even closer relationship between the IMF and banks.").
27. See supra note 23 (discussing U.S. responses); see also infra Part I.C.
28. Hurlock, supra note 3, at 35.
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desire of creditor institutions, especially private banks, to
recoup some part of their losses in this market.
Significantly, debt agreements and subsequent restructur-
ing agreements between LDCs and private banks generally in-
clude in their terms a broad waiver of sovereign immunity, a
declaration establishing the governing law of the contract (com-
monly that of New York or England),29 a provision for suits
under the agreement in the courts of one or more countries
(most often the United States) and procedural provisions to be
applied in the event restructuring becomes necessary. 30 Despite
all these boilerplate provisions, which seem necessary to get
smaller members of loan syndicates on board, major creditors of
LDCs do not attempt to enforce such agreements through the
courts. The reasons follow from the adage "you cannot squeeze
blood from a turnip." Thus, consensual renegotiation is the
norm, even if it does not always go smoothly.31
The process begins when a country cannot service its debts
according to existing agreements because its currency reserves
are or may be jeopardized. The country will then take stock of
its situation and set about formulating a renegotiation plan.
While such plans often include private sector debtors located
within LDCs and Paris Club creditors, 32 the focus here is on the
approach LDC debtors generally take with respect to their
London Club creditors. Within this category, the details, such
as what sub-categories of debt (secured debt, private place-
ments, precious metals contracts, etc.), what mix of principal
and interest, and what maturities the debtor country will seek
to renegotiate, are for the most part not important. It is as-
sumed for present purposes that any renegotiation will seek to
modify the obligations of an existing debt agreement, a sub-
tranche of which the secondary buyer has purchased and would
like to see performed according to its terms.
C. RELEVANT CLAUSES OF RESTRUCTURING PLANS
Renegotiation plans, like original debt agreements, will typ-
ically include a number of provisions that bind the fortunes of
the secondary purchaser to that of its fellow creditors and are
relevant to attempts made by secondary purchasers to enforce
the obligations of the debtor through the courts. The following
29. Id. at 39.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 44.
32. Id. at 34.
1997] 437
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standard clauses are most significant here, as their presence or
absence may guide a court in gauging the bona fide claims of a
plaintiff creditor.
Cross default clauses link together the LDC's various credi-
tors by making it "an event of default"3 3 under an original agree-
ment or a renegotiated agreement if the sovereign defaults on
any other debt agreement to which it is a party. In such an
event, creditors armed with cross default clauses will be entitled
to declare a default, rendering all relevant loans subject to accel-
eration. These provisions are pressed upon debtor nations on
the grounds that all creditors, including commercial creditors,
should be treated in pari passu, notwithstanding that they may
individually be party to multifarious agreements, which may or
may not be in default. Significantly, renegotiated agreements
will often exclude any failure to make payments to commercial
creditors who are not party to the renegotiation from the scope
of cross-default provisions. Such an exclusion may have the ef-
fect of coaxing reluctant but non-litigious creditors to sign on to
the restructuring. As such small creditors will be aware, a trou-
bled LDC will first default on obligations to creditors excluded
from the scope of cross-default clauses. If such a default occurs,
and to the extent the big banks have waived a cross-default
clause in their attempts to induce recalcitrant smaller creditors
to accede to an objectively unfair restructuring plan, a secondary
purchaser may appear justified in using the courts to enforce its
share of the LDC's debt. On the other side of the cross-default
coin, each individual creditor theoretically retains the right not
to participate in the consensual renegotiation and may indeed
initiate litigation to enforce existing debt agreements. 34 The
presence of sharing clauses, however, may still make it unat-
tractive for an excluded creditor to sue in its own right.35
A sharing clause is an undertaking whereby each party to a
debt agreement or renegotiation agrees to share any funds re-
ceived from the debtor pro-rata with all other parties to the syn-
dicate, or possibly all other commercial creditors of the LDC.3 6
This will usually mean sharing with hundreds of banks leaving
33. See id. at 41.
34. See Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Sustaining Lender Commitment to Sovereign
Debtors, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 13 (1992).
35. As to whether sharing clauses are effective means of countering nui-
sance suits by secondary purchasers, see infra Part II.D, discussing various de-
vices employed to avoid the "sharing" mandated by the clause.
36. Such a case might arise where the same major London Club banks are
involved in all or most of the LDC's commercial credits.
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a tiny pro-rata fraction of the pie left in the hands of the origi-
nally receiving party. The clause will typically cover both volun-
tary payments by the debtor to the agent bank managing the
loan (requiring the proceeds to be distributed by the agent) and
proceeds from judicially imposed judgments. In the latter case a
judgment creditor complying with the clause pays other banks
their share or else purchases participations in the proceeds from
them (which is effectively the same thing).37 The motive behind
these clauses is to ensure that no creditor receives more
favorable treatment than others and to encourage creditors not
to hold out from renegotiation. This goal is particularly applica-
ble in situations where commercial creditors are fearful that the
proceeds from new credits are being used to pay off pre-existing
loans in a manner prejudicial to their interests.
Other common provisions are "required banks" clauses,
which set forth a threshold percentage of banks required to take
certain actions pursuant to an original or renegotiated debt
agreement. The particular actions for which consent is required
will vary, as will the percentage threshold for different actions. 38
These clauses typically require that a majority or super-major-
ity3 9 of all creditors agree to a renegotiation plan in order to
bind non-consenting creditors to the new plan. As discussed be-
low, a "required banks" clause was at the heart of the contro-
versy between the Dart family and Brazil. 40
D. U.S. POLICIES TOWARD SOVEREIGN DEBTORS AND
RESTRUCTURINGS
This section presents U.S. responses to the debt crises of
LDCs in order to show that the U.S. policies support cooperation
and consensual action in the resolution of international debt
problems. In all circumstances, these policies were made with
the advice and approval of the IMF, and are germane to the ar-
gument made in Part IV.
37. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 34, at 14.
38. Hurlock, supra note 3, at 42.
39. See, e.g., Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary
Market and Its Implications for Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REv.
2701, 2742-44 (1996) (describing supermajority vote requirements in syndicated
loan agreements).
40. See infra notes 74-85 and accompanying text. In the early 1990s, Bra-
zil engaged in a large buy-back of its own debt, such that it became its own
majority creditor, and then proceeded to try to foist a renegotiation on the
Darts. The Darts sued, claiming such action was an improper method of cir-
cumventing a required banks clause.
4391997]
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1. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (ILSA)
The first non-hortatory41 U.S. response to the debt crisis
was the International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (ILSA),42
which increased the U.S. quota in the IMF and directed the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC
to promulgate regulations implementing the policies of their
1983 Joint Memorandum on the regulation of international
lending.43 One of the elements of the Joint Memorandum was a
proposal that when a debtor country has been unable to service
its debts for a protracted period of time, in specified circum-
stances creditor banks should be required to set aside loss
reserves akin to ordinary loan loss reserves required by U.S.
banking regulations.44 For present purposes it is enough to note
that ILSA exempts loans from the special reserve requirement
where the debtor country is complying with the terms of an IMF-
approved economic stabilization program. As noted, "[tihese
categories, which are used in bank supervisory agency evalua-
tions of bank asset quality. . ., are remarkable in the emphasis
which is put on IMF adjustment programs and on the existence
of multi-bank rescheduling programs."45 Thus, in setting up
this scheme, Congress sought to devise a system that would mo-
tivate private lenders to restructure LDC debt and to ensure
LDC compliance with IMF stabilization programs. 46 This is il-
lustrative of the policy underlying the U.S. regulatory response
to the debt crisis, which was to assume the soundness for ac-
counting purposes of troubled loans to debtor countries that are
within an IMF adjustment program, and presume the unsound-
ness of troubled loans that are not restructured and/or not
within an IMF program.
41. In response to an episode where U.S. commercial banks had made new
money loans to Indonesia in violation of IMF conditions, Congress admonished
U.S. banking regulators to be more diligent in policing inadvisable loans but did
not include specific directions in, for example, the Bretton Woods Agreement
Act Amendments of 1977. Lichtenstein, supra note 23, at 411.
42. Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1278 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3901-12
(1994)).
43. See Proposed Solutions to the International Debt Problems: Hearings on
S. 502 and S. 695, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Ur-
ban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1983) (Joint Memorandum reprinted)
[hereinafter Joint Memorandum].
44. Unlike normal loan loss reserves, ILSA-mandated reserves cannot
count as capital. For further discussion of the technical workings of ILSA, see
Troland S. Link, The Value of Bank Assets Subject to Transfer Risk, 23 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 77-80 (1984).
45. Id. at 79.
46. Lichtenstein, supra note 23, at 416.
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2. International Debt Management Act of 1988 (Debt
Management Act)
This piece of legislation formally recognized a policy in favor
of restructuring and reduction of outstanding LDC debt, noting
that "current approaches to the debt problem should not rely
solely on new lending as a solution to the debt problem and
should focus on other financing alternatives including a reduc-
tion in current debt service obligations."47 As noted above, insol-
vent LDCs and their commercial creditors were generally
inclined to arrange more loans in the hope that LDCs would
"grow out of" situations of insolvency. Early on in the debt cri-
sis, this had been the most politically palatable course of action
for the debtors, as it permitted avoidance, or rather postpone-
ment, of the necessity of conferring with the IMF and taking its
austere medicine. Moreover, as ILSA recognized, further lend-
ing enabled bankers to keep existing loans current on their fi-
nancial statements. Against this backdrop, and recognizing that
wholesale forgiveness would cause irreparable damage to LDC
bank creditors, 48 and likely cause them to withdraw the market
for new loans, the Debt Management Act further announced
that it is "the policy of the United States that.. . it is necessary
to broaden the range of options in dealing with the debt problem
to include improved mechanisms to restructure existing debt."49
3. Support for East European Democracy Act of 1989 (SEED
Act)
While scholarly commentary relating to the international
debt crisis has for the most part focused on Latin American bor-
rowers,50 the situation faced by certain former Soviet bloc coun-
tries such as Poland and Hungary was similarly dire in the
1980s.51 The economic problems of these countries became more
topical as the decade wore on, as newly elected governments in-
herited the sovereign obligations of their communist predeces-
sors, sought membership in the IMF, and further courted
Western capital. Following Treasury Secretary Brady's lead
(discussed below), the United States responded to these changes
47. 22 U.S.C. § 5322 (1994).
48. Lichtenstein, supra note 23, at 414.
49. 22 U.S.C. § 5324 (1994).
50. Eskridge, supra note 8, at 283 (noting also that the debt figures for the
Latin American borrowers were the most dramatic).
51. See, e.g., Western Creditors to Meet with Poland on Its Official Debt,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 1984, at 34 (reporting on Poland's negotiations with credi-
tor governments to restructure $15 billion in debt).
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with the SEED Act of 1989.52 The SEED Act delineates a broad
U.S. policy in favor of Poland and Hungary on a host of issues,
among which are a lead role for the United States in "mobilizing
... [the IMF] and ... the World Bank group, to provide timely
and appropriate resources to help Poland and Hungary."53
Regarding debt relief, the SEED Act provides first that the
United States "shall urge all members of the 'Paris Club' of cred-
itor governments ... to adopt, and participate in, a generous and
early rescheduling program."54 Second, it provides that the
United States shall coordinate with other governments "to facili-
tate a rescheduling and reduction of payments due on debt owed
to [private] creditors in a manner consistent with the interna-
tional debt policy announced by the Secretary of the Treasury on
March 10, 1989." 55 The SEED Act authorized $200 million in
cash stabilization assistance to Poland. In its current incarna-
tion, the SEED Act refers to Poland and Hungary, but its legis-
lative history indicates a general commitment to reform in
Eastern Europe, 56 with IMF involvement a cornerstone of the
process.57
4. The Brady Plan
In March 1989, Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady
announced a plan under which the United States government
would throw its weight behind efforts to resolve the LDC debt
problem, including plans for the securitization of LDC debt into
marketable bonds of long maturity, backed in turn by U.S. treas-
ury securities. 58 These came to be known as Brady Bonds. The
plan constituted an official U.S. recognition that developing
countries would never be able to repay their foreign debts in ac-
cordance with existing contractual commitments. The bold ac-
tion taken by Secretary Brady sought to balance the inability of
LDCs to pay in the near-to-medium term with the demands of
commercial creditors that some substantial repayment occur
eventually. As the Mexican monetary crisis of 1995 illustrates,
the Brady scheme has not been a complete answer to all LDCs'
52. Pub. L. No. 101-179 (1989) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5401-95 (1994)).
53. 22 U.S.C. § 5411(a)(1) (1994).
54. Id. § 5411(b)(2) (1994).
55. Id.
56. See H.R. REP. No. 101-278, at 744 (1989) ("the Committee believes that
the United States has a strong national interest in supporting, consolidating,
and furthering economic and political evolution in Eastern Europe").
57. 22 U.S.C. § 5401(c) (1994).
58. LEHMAN BROTHERS, BRADY BOND MARKET HANDBOOK 3 (1995).
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economic problems, but it has in large measure smoothed over
standoffs between LDCs and their commercial bank creditors. 59
In sum, the plan clarified U.S. support for the restructuring pro-
cess and further emphasized the need for debt reduction as a
means of spurring economic growth and additional lending fur-
ther down the road.
5. Summary
The International Lending Supervision Act and the Interna-
tional Debt Management Act in general, and the Brady Plan and
the SEED Act in particular, demonstrate that the policy of the
United States is to support debtor governments to the extent
they pursue political and economic policies which are consonant
with IMF policies, including support for consensual sovereign
debt restructurings. While these laws and their underlying poli-
cies evolved recently, they are unambiguous and, as argued be-
low, they should be subject to judicial notice in litigation
between debtor nations and their commercial creditors.
II. THE SECONDARY MARKET AND LAWSUITS ARISING
THEREFROM
As commercial lending became the predominant source of
imported capital for LDCs, sovereign debt began to trade at a
discount in the 1980s, much like normal commercial debt instru-
ments. In reactions to the cycle of crises LDCs had faced, many
original lenders of LDCs sought to liquidate LDC debt paper for
whatever the market would bear. This trend spawned and fos-
tered an international secondary market, which has since grown
rapidly. 60 The growth of this market has brought a number of
positive effects. First, secondary trading allows the risks of LDC
defaults to be transferred from a conservative regional U.S.
bank61 to assignees better able to bear the risk or even use it to
their advantage. The market permits disaffected or risk-averse
59. See, e.g., Brazil to Begin Paying $8-Billion Interest Debt, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1991, at D5 (reporting deal to pay $2 billion cash and $6 billion in bonds
that ended a two year standoff with commercial lenders).
60. See, e.g., Review & Outlook: The Baker Plan Lives, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6,
1989, at A13.
61. See, e.g., Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 34, at 3 ("Except for the large inter-
national banks [the prevalence of bank solidarity in syndicated lending] has
now ended, and the underlying differences in exposure levels and business
strategies are becoming important determinants of individual bank decisions
.... Regional and small exposure banks are, for example, redirecting their
lending activity toward traditional domestic and trade financing.").
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institutions to get out of the unstable cycle of crises, reschedul-
ings and, worst of all, involuntary lending as is often necessary
to avoid meltdowns in the wake of crises.6 2 Second, secondary
market sales of LDC debt reduce undesirable retention of trou-
bled and overvalued loans on bank balance sheets. The dis-
counts from par in this market are often huge, and in some cases
sovereign debt instruments have sold for pennies on the dollar.63
This fact underscores the accounting concerns associated with
keeping troubled sovereign loans on banks' balance sheets at full
value. Third, the secondary market gives financial analysts an
incentive to monitor and collect information about LDCs. The
lack of such information was considered a problem for banks in
the 1970s as banks, which were ill-equipped to assess LDCs'
creditworthiness, tended to make LDC loans "blindly." Thus,
while problems may arise where secondary purchasers of sover-
eign debt resort to the courts, the development of the secondary
market has been of considerable benefit to the international fi-
nancial system.
A. LAWSUITS BY SECONDARY PURCHASERS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT
A secondary buyer assumes the rights of its predecessor(s)
in interest, including a legal right to receive principle and inter-
est payments under the original agreement. Whether and when
a buyer may sue in the face of a restructuring agreement and
win special treatment for itself remains an open question.64
Commentators acknowledge the possibility of legal action,65 but
research reveals few instances where this course of action has
62. See id. (noting that most regional U.S. banks cleared their portfolios of
bad sovereign debt by selling at deep discounts into secondary market).
63. See, e.g., Paul M. Sacks, Let Banks Close the Value Gap: Secondary
Markets Could Be Route Out of Latin Debt Crisis, L.A. TIMEs, May 22, 1987, Op.
Ed. 2 (reporting that Sudan's debt traded at two cents on the dollar).
64. This question certainly could be asked with respect to original parties
to debt agreements. The aim here, however, is to demonstrate that the inquiry
is more applicable to secondary purchasers for reason of the smaller and hence
more enforceable claims of secondary buyers, on the one hand, and the disincli-
nation of foreign and regional U.S. banks to engage in litigation, on the other.
Explanations for this latter attitude might include docility, ease of secondary
sales as compared to the costs and uncertainty of litigation (especially in New
York or London, which are normally specified in commercial debt agreements
as the forums where the debtor consents to jurisdiction in litigation arising
under such agreements), or a combination of these.
65. See, e.g., Hurlock, supra note 3, at 44 ("Banks who choose not to sign
the renegotiation agreement may make threats or commence legal action
against the sovereign for repayment of their debt according to... the original
loan documents.").
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resulted in a trial and a published judicial opinion. Despite a
paucity of authority, one commentator asserts that threats, liti-
gation, and other coercive "tactics [by individual creditors] are
much more common than might be expected and are practiced
by a surprising range of institutions."66 It should come as no
surprise that such practices rarely result in litigated judgments
and published case reports, since the recalcitrant creditor is in-
terested only in a quick, strike-suit type settlement, and not in
winning and enforcing a judgment in full. This dynamic makes
settlement exceedingly likely.6 7
It is worth noting here that LDCs will normally have
waived sovereign immunity and made themselves amenable to
process under the terms of sovereign debt agreements. 68 Thus,
while the enforceability of any plaintiffs judgment will be lim-
ited to certain commercial assets, the sovereign debtors, who in
borrowing from banks are deemed to be acting in a commercial
capacity, will in the majority of cases face enforcement actions in
U.S. federal courts under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act,69 or in the courts of other countries. Practical limitations
66. Christine A. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, The Role of Financial Advisors in
Bank Debt Resehedulings, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 49, 54 (1984); see also,
e.g., Weston Compagnie de Finance et d'Investissement, S.A. v. La Republica
del Ecuador, 823 F. Supp. 1106, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (suit by Swiss financial
institution, a substantial part of the business of which involved the acquisition
and trading of Latin American debt); Banque de Gestion Privee-Sib v. La
Republica de Paraguay, 787 F. Supp. 53, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
67. Practical considerations may explain the dearth of published cases on
point and give reason to think that a small number of published case reports
provides no indication of the frequency with which these suits are brought.
Certainly speculative purchasers (and their lawyers) are unlikely to litigate
these cases vigorously in court and up through the appellate process, for an
appellate precedent declaring that such lawsuits may (for whatever reason) not
be maintained would be a disaster. Nor will defendant LDCs want to risk hav-
ing an appeals court declare in a published opinion that these suits are proper
because that would make plaintiffs' lawyers' threats to take such cases to trial
more credible, necessitating higher settlement offers. Thus, both sides benefit
from the uncertainty that shrouds this type of litigation, and the incentive to
settle is very strong indeed. As noted elsewhere, such a dynamic seems to oper-
ate anytime plaintiffs' lawyers develop a novel or unusual type of nuisance suit.
See Theodore Allegaert, Comment, Derivative Actions By Policyholders on Be-
half of Mutual Insurance Companies, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 1063, 1066 n.15 (1996).
68. See Hurlock, supra note 3, at 34; see also infra notes 159-68 and accom-
panying text (the doctrines of comity and the act of state are generally not ap-
plicable to suits to enforce sovereign debt).
69. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1994). The FSIA establishes federal subject mat-
ter and personal jurisdiction over foreign states where the sovereign is not enti-
tled to immunity under sections 1605-07 or under any applicable international
agreement. This includes instances where the sovereign has waived immunity
expressly or by implication and where the sovereign has engaged in commercial
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on the enforcement of judgments account for the fact that major
London Club creditors generally do not view litigation as a
worthwhile option.70 Suits by "smaller" plaintiffs, however, are
more credible: judgment will be more readily enforceable, since
virtually any LDC will at any given time have a couple of million
dollars' worth of commercial assets present in the United States
which might be attached.
As to the frequency with which "smaller" plaintiffs resort to
the courts, the evidence available is modest. Anecdotal evidence
from conversations with lawyers in New York lends support to
the assertion above that suits by secondary creditors are com-
mon.7 ' One recent lawsuit reported in the British press in-
volved a British Virgin Islands-registered investment company
suing Vietnam's largest state-owned bank for repayment of a
$1.5 million dollar portion of Vietnamese sovereign debt in the
High Court in London.72 The lawsuit hindered a proposed
rescheduling of $800 million in Vietnamese debt owed to the
London Club. Perhaps because the stakes were high, and the
value of the claim comparatively low, the settlement reached
was reportedly quite generous. This settlement in turn created
worries among English bankers and lawyers that other non-
London Club assignees of Vietnamese or other LDC debt would
be encouraged to seek their own settlements through the courts.
activities, including commercial loans. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(2). This is in
keeping with the "restrictive" view of sovereign immunity adopted by the State
Department after World War II, under which foreign governments are not enti-
tled to immunity for their actions.
70. See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 346 (noting that "only the property in
[the United States] used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is
based" may be attached). This in theory is limited to "the loan," but as a practi-
cal matter cross default clauses in the loan will enable the debt of state trading
companies to be accelerated and their assets attached. One trader at CS First
Boston with whom I spoke suggested that one of the factors which kept Peru
honest in its dealing with creditors, despite its extreme political climate, was
the fear that wholesale repudiation of its external debt obligations might result
in the confiscation of its newly-nationalized oil tankers when they pulled into,
for example, Galveston Harbor.
71. A "bank" or "financial institution" will virtually always be the plaintiff
in this type of lawsuit. Before an assignment to a non-bank assignee will be
accepted by the international agent, debt agreements by their terms usually
require that the assignee agree to be bound by any restructuring agreed to by a
lesser majority of commercial creditors than normally necessary to bind dis-
senting bank creditors.
72. See Jeremy Grant, Offer Saves Vietnam Assets, FIN. IMEs, Jan. 25,
1996, at 6.
446 [Vol. 6:429
CRDITORS AvD DEBTOR NATIONS
Bankers fear such a state of affairs will further complicate
London Club negotiations. 73
B. CIBC BAN. THE DART LITIGATION
The controversy that brought the potential profitability of
secondary purchases of LDC debt to the world's attention arose
between Brazil and Florida's Dart family.74 The Darts, of
Styrofoam cup fame, instructed traders at Salomon Brothers (of
which they own 5%) to begin buying Brazilian debt paper unob-
trusively on the secondary market, which they then assigned to
a specially created Cayman Islands "bank."75 Within a year, af-
ter buying from creditor banks at prices between 25 and 40 cents
on the dollar, the Cayman bank became the fourth largest single
holder of Brazilian Debt. During this period the Darts had con-
verted their holdings at face value into "capitalization bonds,"
the coupons of which were due to rise over the next six years. In
1993, however, Brazil cut a deal with Citibank and other large
U.S. bank creditors to convert 35% of its outstanding debt, in-
cluding the Darts' holdings, into other bonds at substantially
less than face value. The Darts refused to accede to this and
proceeded to engage Brazil in a "colossal game of chicken," the
aim of which was to secure a deal for themselves substantially
better than the arrangement agreed to by the big banks and fi-
nance ministry officials, but without going so far as to cause the
restructuring to collapse. 76
The Darts brought suit in federal court in New York a year
later, seeking accelerated repayment of principal and interest on
their bonds. 77 By that time, Brazil, acting through its central
bank, had swapped $49 billion of debt for the discounted bonds
which the Darts had spurned. In doing so, Brazil had become
the holder of record for 95% of the debt issued under its 1988
73. See id.
74. See Gilpin, supra note 2, at 37; Kenneth N. Gilpin, Dart Family Files
Lawsuit to Nudge Brazilian Bank, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1994, at D5; CIBC
Bank and Trust Company (Cayman) Ltd. v. Banco Central do Brasil, 886 F.
Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss).
75. This maneuver was allegedly designed to avoid provisions in Brazil's
1988 debt agreement requiring that assignment to non-financial institutions be
accompanied by an "Agreement to be Bound" to any restructuring. CIBC Bank,
886 F. Supp. at 1108. Brazil, in its motion for summary judgment, argued that
this was improper. The court, while acknowledging that this argument "may
yet prove to be correct," refused to accept it at the summary judgment stage. Id.
76. See Laurie P. Cohen, Tug of War: Brazil Debt Deal Pits Nation and
U.S. Banks Against Dart Family, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30 1993, at Al.
77. Gilpin, supra note 74, at D5.
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debt agreement. The Dart holdings were part of the remainder.
The Darts' complaint alleged that Brazil's tactics relieved them
of any obligation to be bound by the ensuing restructuring. In a
motion for summary judgment, Brazil argued the contrary and
asserted that the assignment from the Darts to their Cayman
Islands bank was an improper attempt to circumvent the provi-
sions in the 1988 debt agreement requiring non-bank assignees
to go along with the restructuring. Judge Preska, noting that a
ruling on the merits of either side's position required factual
findings, denied the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment.78 Subsequently, the two sides reached a settlement under
which Brazil agreed to pay the Darts $25 million in cash and
$52.3 million in bonds to cover past-due interest on the Darts'
debt holdings, the market value of which increased substantially
with the news that Brazil was on the verge of concluding negoti-
ations with its creditors and resuming debt service. 79
The Dart case is interesting in that it brought to light a type
of controversy which is otherwise unlikely to be published in the
press or in case reports. Indeed, as one trader noted, "[t]his kind
of problem is not new, . . . but it usually occurs with smaller
people. If the Darts had a smaller position, I think there would
be an attempt to buy them out."80 Thus, it appears that these
"problems" can fairly be described as nuisance suits (or incipient
ones, pre-filing): potential plaintiffs bring these actions not to
litigate the merits and reap a full judgment, but rather for some
quick settlement value over the price they paid for their rights.
On that score, it is worth noting that Brazil had moved for sum-
mary judgment under New York's champerty statute,8 ' citing
the fact that the Darts' Cayman Islands bank had brought suit
on its debt on the very first day possible after a contractually
mandated post-assignment waiting period. As with the stand-
ing issue, Judge Preska held that champertous intent is a fac-
tual matter which could not be ruled on as a matter of law.82
The latter part of the federal court decision illustrates the
toothlessness of champerty laws in the context of lawsuits by
78. CIBC Bank, 886 F. Supp. at 1111.
79. Gilpin, supra note 74, at D5.
80. Gilpin, supra note 2, at 37.
81. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 489 (McKinney 1995) (providing that "[n]o... corpora-
tion . . . shall . . . buy or take an assignment of ... a bond [or other debt
instrument], with the intent and for the purpose of bringing an action
thereon").
82. CIBC Bank, 886 F. Supp. at 1111.
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secondary purchasers of LDC debt.83 As the Dart case suggests,
such purchasers are usually fly-by-night offshore "banks" for
whom an adverse finding of champertous intent will be of little
practical consequence, even if the question were ever to get to a
jury. Thus, a ruling on champerty puts the plaintiff out of court
and once in a while costs the plaintiff the other side's attorney
fees, but rarely if ever will the plaintiff be deprived of the ability
to resell the debt paper and turn a profit. In sum, the ineffec-
tiveness of champerty laws, coupled with the difficulty of win-
ning summary judgment in cases involving complex contractual
relationships, suggests the need for a novel approach by judges
in the adjudication of such actions.
Beyond the practical difficulties in fending off these actions,
this kind of litigation is inequitable and inconsistent with U.S.
policy. In the Dart case, the United States filed an amicus cu-
riae brief in support of Brazil, signed by officials from the Jus-
tice, Treasury, and State Departments, an unusual step for the
United States to take in a civil dispute involving international
debt agreements.8 4 The U.S. government's brief stated flatly
that
[b]ecause the United States has a strong interest in encouraging the
voluntary restructuring of sovereign debt... [it] does not wish to see a
creditor use United States courts as a means of amending the terms of
sovereign debt contracts [on the grounds that such action] would harm
the process that has evolved to deal with sovereign debt problems.
8 5
In light of the subsequent settlement, Judge Preska's refusal to
grant summary judgment in the face of the government's oppo-
sition to the suit gives an even greater indication that a new
approach is called for to enable judges to counter such lawsuits
effectively when the equities of the situation support dismissal.
Such an approach will be particularly desirable in suits by
smaller holders seeking to be bought out at a premium, since the
U.S. government would be less likely to go to the trouble of reg-
istering its opposition.
83. See also Banque de Gestion Privee-Sib v. La Republica de Paraguay,
787 F. Supp. at 56 ("whether assignee subsequently [to the assignment] forms
an intent to sue ... under the assignment is irrelevant for purposes of [New
York's anti-champerty provision]").
84. Thomas T. Vogel, U.S. Files Brief Supporting Brazil in Dart's Debt-In-
terest Suit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 1994, at B4.
85. Id.
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III. THE FUND AGREEMENT
The Bretton Woods System and the IMF were created in
1945 by the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, known as the Bretton Woods Treaty or the Fund Agree-
ment.8 6 The IMF is a multilateral institution providing balance
of payments assistance to member nations and administering a
system of rules designed to shape economic events in the inter-
national financial sphere.8 7 The goals of the Fund are complex
and not necessarily in harmony with each other in certain cir-
cumstances. Moreover, the role of the IMF in the international
financial system has changed over the years, particularly with
the demise of the par-value currency system in the 1970s and
the creation of the Special Drawing Right, events which are not
pertinent here. Despite competing goals and vast changes in the
international financial system and the IMF's role, the first pur-
pose of the Fund Agreement remains fixed: "to promote interna-
tional monetary cooperation""" in order to promote the growth of
world trade and foster stability in the financial sector. This sec-
tion discusses some general difficulties that lawyers and judges
have faced in interpreting the Fund Agreement and applying it
to legal problems. The crux of the matter is that in interpreting
the Fund Agreement and applying it to concrete cases, the "plain
meaning" of the text is at best the tip of the interpretive iceberg.
A. THE DRAFTING OF THE FuND AGREEMENT
The preliminary groundwork for the Fund Agreement was
largely performed during World War II by Harry Dexter White
(of the United States) and Lord Keynes.89 Their ideas and pro-
posals for a post-war international monetary system differed in
a number of respects, particularly their views on the desirability
of exchange controls.90 As Professor Dam has noted, this "con-
flict in ideologies [between the United States and United King-
dom] concerning the functions of economic policy and the role of
the government in economic life complicated agreement on the
86. Fund Agreement, supra note 5, art. (i).
87. DAM, supra note 15, at 115.
88. Fund Agreement, supra note 5, art. 1(i).
89. John S. Williams, Extraterritorial Enforcement of Exchange Control
Regulations Under the International Monetary Fund Agreement, 15 VA. J. INT'L
L. 319, 322 (1975).
90. Keynes thought exchange controls, at least on capital movements, were
beneficial and should be a permanent part of the post-war system. DAM, supra
note 15, at 76.
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details of postwar international monetary organization."9 1
Thus, the drafting of the Fund Agreement was characterized by
hard bargaining, compromise, and different levels of influence
by the United States, United Kingdom and the other Bretton
Woods delegations. 92 Inevitably, this process of drafting by na-
tions with different views and agendas9" resulted in ambiguity,
contradiction, and at times opaqueness in the Articles of the
Fund Agreement.94 This is especially true from the vantage
point of a non-expert. 95
To take a germane example of such a contradiction, Article I
of the Fund Agreement states that "foreign exchange restric-
tions which hamper the growth in world trade" are undesirable
and should be eliminated. 96 Article VIII, however, provides for
the maintenance of exchange controls in a number of circum-
stances, some to be valid during a transitional period and others
permanently. Since exchange controls persist to this day, par-
ticularly with respect to capital transactions, Article VIII would
appear to have trumped Article I. This could not have been
known ex ante from the text of the Fund Agreement or its
travaux pr'paratoires.9 7
The Fund Agreement left much to be worked out in the
evolution of the new Bretton Woods System and to later inter-
pretation of various provisions. As Sir Joseph Gold, the long-
time general counsel to the IMF, states in his comprehensive
treatment of the law of the Fund Agreement: "[t]he problem
then will be to decide which purpose or purposes [of the Articles
of the Fund Agreement] are to be given decisive weight in order
to increase the likelihood that over time all the purposes of the
fund can be realized."98 Thus, in grappling with the Fund
Agreement, it is almost always ill-advised and incorrect for
courts to interpret the "plain meaning" of specific provisions of
91. Id.
92. Williams, supra note 89, at 323.
93. See FREDERICK A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 383 n.39 (Clar-
endon Press 4th ed. 1982) ("The conference of 44 nations and about 200 dele-
gates was an unusually rushed and confused affair.... The delegates believed
they had covered a great field of intellectual and technical difficulty which
many, it seems, later confessed not to have understood." (citing XXVI THE CoL-
LECTED WORKS OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 96-113 (1980))).
94. Id. ("The Articles of Agreement as a whole are ... full of discrepancies
and drafting obscurities .... ").
95. DAM, supra note 15, at 85.
96. Fund Agreement, supra note 5, art. I(iv).
97. 2 JOSEPH GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS app. A at 437
(1982).
98. Id. at 3.
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its text without considering expert commentary and available
case precedent.
B. INTERPRETATION OF THE FuND AGREEMENT BY THE IMF
One issue of ongoing dispute is whether official IMF inter-
pretations of the Fund Agreement are binding on the courts of
member nations. Shortly after the implementation of the Fund
Agreement, one commentator, Mr. Bernard Meyer, predicted
that "[U.S.] courts will give conclusive effect in private litigation
to Fund interpretations," despite the fact that the article provid-
ing for Fund determinations was not incorporated into U.S. do-
mestic law by the Bretton Woods Agreement Act.99 More
recently, Sir Gold took the view that official IMF pronounce-
ments are binding in advance on the courts of member nations,
and he presented case law where courts appear to have consid-
ered themselves bound by the IMF's interpretation.100 Still an-
other commentator, Mr. Williams, challenged this view on the
grounds that two of the U.S. cases Sir Gold cited were overruled
on appeal.' 0 '
Dr. F.A. Mann, in The Legal Aspect of Money, asserted that
"it is both the right and the duty of the courts to construe [provi-
sions of the Articles], and . . . there is no justification for the
opinion that 'in view of Article XIII of the Agreement, 0 2 it is
undesirable for [courts] to express a view [on the subject]. '""03
Whatever differences there may be between Sir Gold, Dr. Mann
and others on this issue, it appears that from the 1950s onward
courts have not hesitated to make their own interpretations of
99. Bernard S. Meyer, Recognition of Exchange Controls After the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Agreement, 62 YALE L.J. 867, 883 (1953) (Article XIII (as
it then was) provided for official interpretations by the Board of Governors of
the IMF). Under the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement, effec-
tive April 1, 1978, the provision for authoritative interpretation of the Articles
was moved to Article XXIX See GOLD, supra note 97, at xi. Mr. Meyer asserts
that the fact that Article XIII was not given "the force of law" by Congress when
it incorporated the Fund Agreement into domestic law is of small consequence,
since the entire Fund Agreement, as a "congressional-executive agreement,"
would be the supreme law of the land. Meyer, supra, at 880.
100. GOLD, supra note 97, at 5-6.
101. Williams, supra note 89, at 331-32.
102. Now Article XXIX (see supra note 99).
103. MANN, supra note 93, at 383 (quoting Kahler v. Midland Bank, 1 All
E.R. 811, 819 (1948)). A similar reluctance to interpret the Articles of Agree-
ment was expressed contemporaneously with Kahler by an appellate court in
New York. See Cermak v. Bata Akciova Spolecnost, 80 N.Y.S.2d 782, 785
(1948).
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the Fund Agreement. 10 4 As a result, there is a notable lack of
uniformity in judicial constructions of the Fund Agreement by
the courts of various nations.105
From the mass of conflicting accounts and the abundance of
cases interpreting the Fund Agreement, one commentator has
reasonably concluded:
a court may decide [for itself] whether or not an interpretation of the
Fund Agreement is legally correct and therefore binding upon it,
although an interpretation by the Board of Governors under Article
XIII may be highly persuasive as to what the correct interpretation of
such a provision should be. [Nevertheless,] a court is bound ... only
because it has determined on its own that its interpretation is legally
correct.
10 6
Thus, in cases involving the Fund Agreement brought in U.S.
courts, existing and future IMF interpretations of the Fund
Agreement may provide a sound basis for overruling prior judi-
cial interpretations of relevant provisions, to the extent judges
are willing lend decisive weight in considering such
pronouncements.
C. INTERPRETATION OF THE FUND AGREEMENT BY COURTS
As a treaty, the Fund Agreement should be broadly
construed and where necessary, re-construed to effect its under-
lying purpose, "to promote international monetary coopera-
tion."107 Treaties in general, and the Bretton Woods Treaty in
particular, should not be construed in the same manner as do-
mestic legislation. As one English judge has said, "[tihe lan-
guage of an international convention.., is neither couched in
the conventional English legislative idiom nor designed to be
construed exclusively by English judges."108 Accordingly, a
treaty should be interpreted "unconstrained by technical rules of
English law, or by English legal precedent, but on broad princi-
104. Williams, supra note 89, at 332 n.57.
105. See infra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.
106. Williams, supra note 89, at 330 (emphasis in original).
107. Fund Agreement, supra note 5, art. I(i); Williams, supra note 89, at
324-25. In regard to treaty construction by U.S. courts, see, e.g., Air France v.
Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396 (1985) ("Treaties are construed more liberally than pri-
vate agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the writ-
ten words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical
construction adopted by the parties."); Maritime Ins. Co. v. Emery Air Freight
Corp., 983 F.2d 437, 440 (2d Cir. 1993) ("when language is unclear, courts are
enjoined to construe treaties more liberally than private agreements").
108. GOLD, supra note 97, at 5-6 n.5 (quoting Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines,
2 All E.R. 696, 706 (1980)).
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ples of general acceptation."10 9 The gist of these observations is
no less applicable to other forums, especially common law fo-
rums such as the United States, where domestic legal precedent
may stand in the way of the soundest interpretation of the
treaty.
For example, if a given provision of the Fund Agreement
was intended to provide a rule of uniform substantive law for all
members, then it makes no sense for courts to evaluate a contro-
versy only in light of legal conceptions which are peculiar to its
forum. 110 If precedent is to be used, then the experience of the
courts of other member nations whether common law or not
ought to be as persuasive to a U.S. tribunal in this context as
domestic precedents. Indeed, it is an open question whether
stare decisis is properly applicable to interpretations of a com-
plex and vaguely worded treaty where as here the economic
framework within which the treaty operates may change over
time.
Further along these lines, Sir Gold has observed that the
uniformity and soundness of judicial treatments of the Fund
Agreement have been limited by the tendency of lawyers to rely
on domestic authorities in briefing issues before courts.
Whether through neglect or inaccessibility of foreign materials,
courts have often decided cases involving the Fund Agreement
without the "full store of jurisprudence and critical material.""'
This has resulted in a measure of parochiality in the area of
Fund Agreement jurisprudence. Whatever the exact explana-
tion, the disinclination of courts to square their interpretations
of the Fund Agreement with those of other members' courts has
led them to treat the Fund Agreement as a domestic legal in-
strument, thus placing "more emphasis on verbal considerations
than on purpose." 12
From this it is reasonable to conclude that interpretation of
the Fund Agreement should be an evolutionary process, subject
to correction and re-evaluation in light of experience. This is
easier said than done, however. As Sir Gold has noted:
109. Id.
110. MANN, supra note 93, at 373-75. The situation described in the text
might occur, for example, where a foreign-drafted exchange contract is con-
strued by a common law court in light of common law conceptions (under con-
flict of law rules), even though the language of Article VIII of the Agreement,
governing the enforceability of exchange contracts, presupposes that the proper
law of the contract will govern.
111. GOLD, supra note 97, at 5.
112. Id. at 6.
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The growing awareness of the relevance of the Articles to certain legal
problems that affect private parties has not always led to legal solu-
tions that are fully compatible with the economics of the Articles. It
should be a cardinal rule of interpretation that the solution of a legal
problem involving the Articles should make maximum economic sense.
This rule can be difficult to apply in some cases.1
1 3
For the future and as set forth in the next section, U.S. courts
and lawyers briefing issues pertaining to the Fund Agreement
should accept that foreign jurisprudence and foreign commen-
tary are of no lesser value than domestic authorities. Their use
may promote uniformity, tractability, and economic sense in the
law of the international monetary system. Courts should also
notice that the chaotic environment in which the Fund Agree-
ment was drafted resulted in language that was in some mea-
sure a "historical accident."11 4 This in turn should provide
further impetus to look beyond the language of the treaty to its
underlying core purpose, "to promote international monetary
cooperation."' 1 5
IV. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ENFORCEMENT SUITS
BY MALCONTENT COMMERCIAL CREDITORS
OF LDCS
The IMF and the international monetary system are not co-
terminous, and much that goes on in the system occurs outside
the purview of the IMF. 116 This section argues that Article VIII,
section 2 of the Fund Agreement should be interpreted liberally
in order to align the approach taken by U.S. courts in cases seek-
ing enforcement of LDC debt agreements with IMF policies, es-
pecially since IMF policies are essentially congruent with those
of the political branches of the U.S. government. This approach
will foster and maintain IMF involvement in the economic ar-
rangements of LDCs, while discouraging both unilateral repudi-
ations and non-IMF-approved workouts by LDCs.
A. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 2(b) To BAR SurrS BY COMMERCIAL
CREDITORS OF LDCs
Article VIII, section 2(b) of the IMF Articles of Agreement
provides that "[e]xchange contracts which involve the currency
of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control
113. Id. at 3.
114. Meyer, supra note 99, at 889 (discussing Article VIII, § 2(b)).
115. MANN, supra note 93, at 384.
116. DAM, supra note 15, at 76.
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regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently
with this agreement, shall be unenforceable in the territories of
any member."117 The "plain meaning" of this text is that certain
contracts that are offensive to the exchange control regulations
of an IMF member country (other than the one in which the fo-
rum is situated) cannot be enforced. The precise meaning and
applicability of this provision, however, has been the subject of
more litigation and more controversy among commentators than
any other provision of the Fund Agreement, 118 and the meaning
of virtually all of its terms has been disputed. 1 9 The IMF has
provided clarification only on the question of whether Article
VIH, section 2(b) was intended to override the public policy of
the forum, which is now deemed to be the case. 120 As Sir Gold
noted in 1982, "it will be obvious [from inquiry] ... that the last
word on the meaning of the provision has not been uttered by
courts or authors."' 2 ' This section evaluates some of the inter-
pretive positions that courts and commentators have taken and
117. Fund Agreement, supra note 5, art. VIII, § 2(b). This provision has the
full force and effect of domestic law in the United States, 22 U.S.C.A. § 286(h)
(1996), and in 50 IMF member countries as of 1980. See INTERNATIONAL MONE-
TARY FUND 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 83, 122, table 1.14 (1980).
118. GOLD, supra note 97, at 2.
119. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 89, at 332.
120. The IMF has officially (though somewhat repetitively and unhelpfully)
interpreted Article VIII section 2(b) as follows:
Parties entering into exchange contracts involving the currency of
any member of the Fund and contrary to exchange control regulations
of that member which are maintained or imposed consistently with the
Fund Agreement will not receive the assistance of the judicial or ad-
ministrative authorities of other members in obtaining the perform-
ance of such contracts. That is to say, the obligations of such contracts
will not be implemented by the ... authorities of member countries,
for example, by decreeing performance of the contracts or by awarding
damages for their non-performance....
An obvious result of the foregoing undertaking is that if a party to
an exchange contract of the kind referred to in Article VIII, section 2(b)
seeks to enforce such a contract, the tribunal of the member country
before which the proceedings are brought will not, on the ground that
they are contrary to public policy (ordre public) of the forum, refuse
recognition of the exchange control regulations of the other member
which are maintained or imposed consistently with the Fund Agree-
ment. It also follows that such contracts will be treated as unenforce-
able notwithstanding that under the private international law of the
forum, the law under which the foreign exchange control regulations
are maintained or imposed is not the law which governs the exchange
contract or its performance.
National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems,
14 Fed. Reg. 5208-09 (1949). On the ordre public issue, accord Perutz v. Bohe-
mian Discount Bank in Liquidation, 304 N.Y. 533 (1953).
121. GOLD, supra note 97, at 2.
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endeavors to demonstrate that Article VIII, section 2(b) is prop-
erly applicable to lawsuits brought by secondary purchasers of
LDC debt. Although the interpretation advocated here is at
odds with a number of extant U.S. precedents, it is submitted,
that those precedents are either wrongly decided or are distin-
guishable from the type of case under scrutiny here.
1. LDC debt agreements should be deemed "exchange
contracts which involve the currency" of member nations
The phrase "exchange contract" is nowhere defined in the
Fund Agreement. In the fifty years since the Bretton Woods
Treaty was drafted, courts and commentators have put forth dif-
ferent definitions of the phrase. Some have taken a "narrow"
textual view, restricting the phrase to mean contracts for the
exchange of one currency against another or one means of pay-
ment (such as gold) against another. 122 Others have adopted a
"broad" definition of "exchange contracts," encompassing all con-
tracts which affect a member country's exchange resources.
This article argues in favor of the latter.
a. The "narrow" view of "exchange contracts" was incorrect
from the start
Based on the text of the Bretton Woods Treaty, it might
seem reasonable to limit the scope of Article VIII, section 2(b) to
money-changing transactions. If correct, this would permit the
courts of IMF member nations to hear, decide and decree per-
formance in cases involving transactions in goods, barter agree-
ments, and even more relevant here, agreements to borrow and
repay a given currency, notwithstanding the effect such decrees
will have on the exchange resources of other (defendant) IMF
member nations.
The New York Court of Appeals was the first U.S. court to
endorse (in dicta) the narrow view in Banco do Brasil v. A.C.
Israel Commodity Co. 123 The plaintiff, an instrumentality of the
government of Brazil, sought damages from a U.S. coffee im-
porter who had contracted to pay a Brazilian coffee exporter
cash for coffee received, rather than (some greater amount of)
dollars to the Brazilian authorities, as required by Brazil's
"forced sale" exchange control laws. 124 While basing its holding
122. Williams, supra note 89, at 333.
123. 12 N.Y.2d 371 (1963).
124. The exporter, in turn, would be able to sell these dollars on the black
market for more cruzeiros than it would have received had the payment been
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on other grounds, the court considered and disapproved the con-
tention that the agreement was an "exchange contract" contrary
to the exchange control regulations, stating:
We are inclined to view an interpretation of subdivision (b) of section 2
that sweeps in all contracts affecting any members' exchange resources
as doing considerable violence to the text of the section. It says 'involve
the currency' of the country whose exchange controls are violated; not
'involve the exchange resources'.1 25
In approving the narrow view, the court cited a much-disputed
article by Mr. Arthur Nussbaum 126 which argued that Article
VIII, section 2(b) reaches only "transactions which have as their
immediate object 'exchange', that is, international media of pay-
ment."127 The difficulty inherent in this citation is that Mr.
Nussbaum acknowledged that the meaning of "exchange con-
tracts" is by no means self-explanatory, and he conceded that
"national enactments on exchange control often invalidate unli-
censed contracts not directly concerned with international me-
dia of payment."128  Despite this acknowledgment, Mr.
Nussbaum (warning that then totalitarian governments such as
Poland and Czechoslovakia will "go to great lengths to extend
their control") made the unsupported assertion that "[it cannot
be the meaning of the Agreement that the other member coun-
tries have to carry out such policies."129 This was a misguided
observation even at the height of the Cold War for "such poli-
cies" would surely not have been "imposed consistently with" the
Fund Agreement and therefore not within Article VIII, section
2(b). Also, Mr. Nussbaum's acknowledgment that countries had
previously applied exchange control enactments to a range of
contracts affirms the possibility that the drafters of the Fund
Agreement had a broader meaning in mind.
channeled through the government. Brazil's cause of action was premised on
its contention that because the agreement violated Brazil's exchange control
laws, Article VIII, section 2(b) provided a basis for recovery. The court stated
that even if Article VII were applicable, which it doubted, the obligation to
withhold judicial assistance in enforcing the contract did not imply an obliga-
tion to impose tort penalties on the contracting party. Id. at 376-77.
125. Id. at 375-76.
126. Id. at 375 (citing Arthur Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, 59 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1950)).
127. Arthur Nussbaum, Exchange Control and the International Monetary
Fund, 59 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1950). For commentary taking issue with Mr.
Nussbaum on this point, see, e.g., Meyer, supra note 99, at 885-86; Williams,
supra note 89, at 334-35.
128. Nussbaum, supra note 127, at 426.
129. Id. at 426-27.
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A second problem with the A. C. Israel dicta is its concern
with the violence that a broad definition would do to the text.
This is misguided, since the text of the agreement is universally
acknowledged to be less than letter-perfect. The text of Article
VIII, section 2(b) has been described by Dr. Mann as "so unsatis-
factory."' 30 Even Mr. Nussbaum himself commented that he
had little "confidence in the accuracy of the draft."' 3 ' Thus, for
all the reasons discussed above in Section III, anything ap-
proaching strict reliance on the text of the Fund Agreement, es-
pecially the text of Article VIH, section 2(b), is not an
appropriate method of discerning its meaning. This was the
mistake made by the A.C. Israel court and later courts adopting
its dicta.
A.C. Israel was later cited by the New York Court of Ap-
peals and other U.S. courts as authority for the application of
the narrow view to a variety of contexts, 32 such as the "Cuban
insurance cases" that arose after Fidel Castro withdrew Cuba
from the IMF.' 33 Yet, for all the citation of the opinion, there is
ample reason to believe that Mr. Nussbaum and the A.C. Israel
court and later judicial opinions relying on them were wrong.
Perturbingly for present purposes, the narrow view was
adopted by Chief Judge Motley as one of several parts of the
holding in Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica
S.A 134 This case involved an action by a commercial creditor in
which it succeeded in enforcing an LDC loan after the govern-
ment of Costa Rica repudiated its obligations to commercial
creditors.' 35 Chief Judge Motley's opinion did not acknowledge
that the A.C. Israel language was dicta derived from the dis-
puted view of a single commentator. Nor did it acknowledge
that later opinions adopting the narrow view relied first and
foremost on A.C. Israel. Nevertheless, because the action by
130. MANN, supra note 93, at 383.
131. Nussbaum, supra note 127, at 426.
132. See, e.g., J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays Bank (Uganda) Ltd., 37
N.Y.2d 220, 229 (1975) ("[irrevocable] letter of credit not an exchange contract")
(citing AC. Israel, 12 N.Y.2d at 375-76); see also John Sanderson & Co. (Wool)
Pty., Ltd. v. Ludlow Jute Co., Ltd., 569 F.2d 696, 699 (1st Cir. 1988) (approving
narrow interpretation of "exchange contract").
133. See, e.g., Theye y Ajuria v Pan American Life Ins. Co., 161 So. 2d 70, 74
(La. 1964) ("a contract payable in ... Louisiana in United States currency is
not an exchange contract").
134. 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
135. Id. The number of reported U.S. cases which resulted in an LDC credi-
tor winning a litigated judgment is small, probably due to the tendency of this
type of case to settle. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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Costa Rica suspending external debt payments was taken with-
out the involvement of the IMF, the result in Libra Bank is con-
sistent with the framework advanced here. 136 Still, Chief Judge
Motley's discussion of Article VIII, section 2(b) provides further
support for the narrow definition of exchange contracts and, for
a federal court in the Southern District of New York to apply the
framework proposed in this article, that part of the Libra Bank
decision will need to be reconsidered. 137 Expert authorities,
such as Sir Gold, and decisions of courts in other IMF member
nations, discussed next, compel the conclusion that Chief Judge
Motley and the authorities she cited were incorrect in adopting
the narrow view of "exchange contracts." 38
b. The weight of authority favors a broad definition of
exchange contracts, one which encompasses LDC
commercial loans
The narrow view begs the interesting question of why the
drafters of the Fund Agreement would protect controls on
straight money-changing from interference by foreign courts,
when other transactions could have an equally deleterious effect
on a country whose currency reserves are in need of protection.
Writing shortly after Mr. Nussbaum, Mr. Meyer rejected the
narrow view, stating:
The context of the agreement clearly demonstrates ... that an 'ex-
change transaction'... covers a broad range of dealings. The fact that
in a number of instances the Agreement contains language limiting the
phrase to media transactions indicates that the drafters knew how to
limit the phrase when they wanted to and bears out the conclusion
that 'exchange transaction' is not limited to international media of
payment.
*.. The illogic of the contrary position, which would render media
transactions unenforceable but would leave untouched the quantita-
136. See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text for further discussion of
Libra Bank.
137. Apparently the First Circuit and the Southern District of New York are
the only federal courts that have had occasion to construe Article VIII, section
2(b). Thus, no other federal court is bound to follow the narrow interpretation
of "exchange contracts."
138. See also Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v. Terruzzi, 1 Q.B. 683, 709 (C.A.
1976) (futures contract on the London Metal Exchange executed by Italian
"gambler" in violation of Italian exchange control law not an exchange con-
tract); MANN, supra note 93, at 388 ("The aim of Article VIII, section 2(b) is...
to ensure a measure of respect for a member State's financial control. Further-
more, there exists a vast number of transactions which do not come within the
Court of Appeal's definition . . . which, on account of their danger to the econ-
omy, a legislator is justified not only in prohibiting, but also in expecting to be
shunned.").
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tively greater-and therefore more harmful-dealings in other forms
of property and services, substantiates [this position].
We are thus led to the conclusion that the term 'exchange con-
tracts,' as used in Article VIII, section 2(b), means transactions having
their bases in contract and involving exchange, whether of currency,
property, or services.
13 9
Writing on this point in 1964, Sir Gold, a leading authority on
the IMF, 140 is unequivocal: "After the learned discussions of the
last decade or more, [the narrow interpretation of 'exchange con-
tracts'] can be taken seriously only if the normal scope of ex-
change control and the purpose of Article VIII, section 2(b)...
are ignored." 141 Thus, notwithstanding the "plain meaning" of
the words, "exchange contracts" means contracts which in any
way affect a country's exchange resources so as to be liable to
reduce them.142 This definition has been adopted by a majority
of commentators,' 43 as well as courts in Germany, France, and
Luxembourg.144
Once a court accepts the broad interpretation of the phrase
"exchange contracts," a loan agreement between an LDC and a
commercial creditor falls within the meaning of the term, even
where the contract calls for disbursement and repayment of the
loan in the same currency. The servicing of external debts will
in all circumstances vitally affect the debtor country's foreign ex-
139. Meyer, supra note 99, at 885-87 (citing F.A. Mann, Money in Public
International Law, 26 BRrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 259, 279 (1949)).
140. DAm, supra note 15, at xvi-xvii.
141. GOLD, supra note 97, at 11.
142. Joseph Gold, 'Exchange Contracts," Exchange Control, and the IMF Ar-
ticles of Agreement: Some Animadversions on Wilson, Smithett & Cope Ltd. v.
Terruzzi, 33 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 777, 787-89 (1984); see also MANN, supra note
93, at 385. Mann, taking the view presented in the text, states:
This [interpretation] would appear to be in better harmony with the
purpose of the Agreement and the true intentions of its authors to be
gathered from it, but admittedly makes the word 'exchange' redundant
.... So to disregard an important word may run counter to established
principles of interpretation. Yet it is submitted that this objection,
grave though it may be, is outweighed by the fact that no other inter-
pretation would achieve the overriding purposes of the Agreement.
Id.
143. See Williams, supra note 89, at 344 ("Most contemporary authorities
reject.., the narrow construction and favor the broad interpretation.").
144. See, e.g., Lessinger v. Mirau, 22 I.L.R. 725 (Schleswig-Holstein Ct. App.
1954) (dollar loan by one Austrian resident to another repayable in dollars was
an 'exchange contract'); DeBoer, Widow Moojen v. Von Reichert, 51 REV. C=rT.
DROIT INT'L PaVwE 67, 89 (1962) (contract for sale of shares in French Corpora-
tion by Dutch resident to a German in return for French Francs was an 'ex-
change contract' even though one single currency involved); Societe Filature et
Tissage X Jourdan v. Epoux Heynen Binter, 22 I.L.R. 727 (1956) (contract for
sale of goods in exchange for currency is an exchange contract).
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change resources. When an LDC repays a loan in dollars, the
acquisition and release of those dollars necessarily reduces the
LDC's exchange reserves. When low reserves jeopardize an
LDC government's ability to manage current account problems,
such a reduction may be utterly unacceptable. In sum, a sover-
eign loan agreement is a contract which necessarily contem-
plates exchange, and the performance of such a contract will
always reduce the exchange resources of the debtor. In this
light, the loan agreement by an LDC to borrow dollars and repay
dollars necessarily "involve[s]" the currency of the LDC.145
2. A decision to suspend debt service and/or seek
restructuring of sovereign loan agreements should be
deemed "exchange control regulation" within the meaning
of Article VIII
"Exchange control regulation" is not defined with legal pre-
cision in the Fund Agreement or in any decision of the Executive
Directors of the IMF. 146 Sir Gold interprets the term to mean
both restrictions on current payments for international transac-
tions1 47 and "such controls as are necessary to regulate interna-
tional capital movements."' 48 Dr. Mann defines the term as
"enactments that control the movement of currency ... for the
purposes of protecting the financial resources of a country." 49
Concluding that a decision to suspend performance and seek re-
structuring of sovereign debt agreements is an "exchange con-
trol regulation" should not be controversial, for the impetus
behind such government action is the defense of the debtor coun-
145. See MANN, supra note 93, at 391 ("The phrase 'which involve the cur-
rency' contemplates... not the denomination in a particular currency, but the
financial area within which the transaction has economic effects. 'Currency'
should be construed in the broad sense of economics rather than in a strictly
legal sense.").
146. GOLD, supra note 97, at 13.
147. Id. at 125. Such restrictions may be imposed only with the approval of
the Fund. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, art.
VIII, § 2(a).
148. GOLD, supra note 97, at 125. These restrictions may be imposed by
member governments without the approval of the Fund, according to Article IV,
section 3. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
149. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 388 (5th ed. 1992). Williams simi-
larly defines exchange controls to include any measure controlling "the transna-
tional movement of currency, property or services for the purpose of protecting
the financial resources of the controlling country." Williams, supra note 89, at
352.
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try's currency through conservation of national resources*150 It
makes no difference whether the sovereign debtor imposes the
restriction on itself or on private economic actors, since in either
instance such restrictions constitute a species of "financial con-
trol" which Article VIII, section 2(b) aims to protect from scru-
tiny by the judicial authorities of other nations.' 51 Whether
such restrictions are imposed consistently with the Fund Agree-
ment, however, is quite another matter and is addressed next.
3. IMF involvement in the affairs of a debtor LDC should be
necessary and sufficient for such LDC's debt restructuring
to qualify as "exchange control regulation imposed
consistently with" the Fund Agreement
If a country is conducting its economic and monetary affairs
with the approval of the IMF, then its debt restructuring-cum-
exchange-control-regulation must be deemed consistent with the
Fund Agreement. Where a particular LDC debt restructuring is
endorsed by the fund, then ipso facto, the restructuring is "im-
posed consistently with" the Fund Agreement. Where the IMF
is currently disbursing loans to the country in question, it will
also be reasonable to conclude that such country's restructuring-
cum-exchange control regulation is consistent with the Fund
Agreement. It is hard to envision a situation where these con-
clusions would not hold, since presumably the IMF will neither
lend money to countries of which it does not approve nor put its
imprimatur on LDC debt workouts that are out of keeping with
its charter.
In a situation where an IMF adjustment program is forth-
coming, but the Fund has not yet approved an LDC's program,
Article VIII, section 2(b) may still function to counter nuisance
suits by small creditors. On this score, Mr. Williams asserted
that "[wihile express approval by the Fund of the regulations
involved is unnecessary [to establish consistency of regulations
with the Fund Agreement], the general character of the regula-
tions must be authorized; insignificant inconsistencies will not
150. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 89, at 356 ("[Ex]change control regula-
tions to which Article VIII, section 2(b) applies are those ... regulations genu-
inely concerned with the conservation of a country's economic resources and are
directed to the financial aspect of an international transaction-whether cur-
rent or capital transaction. Included are rules restricting the making of pay-
ments as well as exchange surrender regulations. Excluded are tariffs, trade
restrictions ... and legal tender laws.").
151. MANN, supra note 149, at 388.
1997]
Mzi. J GLOBAL TRAE [Vol. 6:429
be fatal."15 2 This view allows judges discretion in evaluating a
given debt restructuring for consistency with the Fund Agree-
ment in cases where the IMF has not yet spoken.
While an IMF-approved restructuring ought to be presumed
consistent with the Fund Agreement, the converse situation is
more problematic. Whether a non-IMF-approved debt restruc-
turing is inconsistent with the Fund Agreement requires inquiry
into a further controversy, namely whether "exchange control
regulation" encompasses restrictions on current cross-border
transactions only, or whether, as Sir Gold asserts, it also encom-
passes restrictions on capital movements. 153 It is not wholly
clear whether a sovereign loan agreement is a current or capital
transaction, and research reveals no authority precisely on
point. Article XIX(I), however, defines "payments for current
transactions" as:
[P]ayments which are not for the purpose of transferring capital [in-
cluding], without limitation:
(1) All payments due in connection with foreign trade, other current
business, including services, and normal short-term banking and
credit facilities;
(2) Payments due as interest on loans and as net income from other
investments;
(3) Payments of moderate amount for amortization of loans or for de-
preciation of direct investments...
The Fund may, after consultation with the members concerned, deter-
mine whether certain specific transactions are to be considered current
transactions or capital transactions.1 5 4
This excerpt is not quite conclusive on the question of whether a
sovereign loan is a current transaction, but the language sug-
gests that payments of interest and principal due under sover-
eign loan agreements qualify as current payments, so long as
152. Williams, supra note 89, at 360.
153. GoLD, supra note 97, at 79-81. Article VIII, section 2(a) provides that
"no member shall, without the approval of the Fund, impose restrictions on the
making of payments or transfers for current international transactions." Fund
Agreement, supra note 5, art. VIII, § 2(a). Sir Gold asserted that the "control"
phraseology of section 2(b) casts a wider net than the conditional right to regu-
late current payments provided by Article VIII, section 2(a), citing examples of
.controls" which are not restrictions on payments, such as exchange surrender
requirements. The uncertainty results from the following drafting inaccuracy:
section 2, as originally drafted, pertained only to current transactions and that
text became section 2(a). Section 2(b) was later added to the final version and,
in Sir Gold's view, it applies to all controls, not merely restrictions on current
payments. The addition of section 2(b) was made, however, without changing
the heading of section 2, which still reads "Avoidance of Payments on Current
Transactions." GOLD, supra note 97, at 85-86.
154. Fund Agreement, supra note 5, art. XIX(i).
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"moderate"1 55 in amount. From this it seems reasonable to as-
sume that the agreements themselves are "current transac-
tions." Moreover, taking these terms at face value-risks of
textualism in this context duly noted-"capital transfers" would
seem to connote more or less permanent relocations of capital,
which does not adequately describe loan transactions. Noting
the difficulty in making this distinction, Professor Dam reiter-
ated that the examples in Article XIX are listed "without
limitation."1 56
The distinction between current and capital transactions,
which originated in accounting history,' 57 is of significance to
the framework proposed in this article because while Article
VIII, section 2(a) requires fund approval for restrictions on cur-
rent transactions, Article IV, section 3 leaves members free to
impose restrictions on capital movements. Article VIII, section
2(b) can ensure that both are given effect. The difficulty is that
consistency with the Fund Agreement depends in current trans-
actions on fund approval, while any restriction on capital trans-
fers is consistent with the Fund Agreement. As argued in
Section IV, infra, the framework proposed here would allow for
the possibility of nuisance suits by malcontent LDC creditors
when a repudiation or restructuring occurs without the involve-
ment of the IMF. In such a scheme, non IMF-approved restruc-
turings, repudiations-cum-exchange-control-regulations should
be deemed inconsistent with the Fund Agreement and therefore
not within the reach of Article VIII, section 2(b). That assess-
ment, however, requires that LDC loan agreements be deemed
current transactions, since all restrictions on capital transfers
are "imposed consistently" with the Fund Agreement, whether
IMF-approved or not, per Article IV, section 3.
To the extent that LDC loan agreements do not self-evi-
dently belong to one category or the other, and assuming that
Article XIX does not fully answer the question, recourse should
be had to "[p]roper analysis [of] the economic and accounting
concepts and policies at stake."158 It is submitted that the policy
of promoting international monetary cooperation that under-
girds the Fund Agreement militates in favor of viewing LDC
loan agreements as current transactions so that they may be
155. One is entitled to wonder what yardstick "moderateness" is to be mea-
sured against; presumably sums which are very large in some contexts will nev-
ertheless be moderate in the sovereign loan context.
156. DAM, supra note 15, at 100.
157. Williams, supra note 89, at 359.
158. Id.
1997] 465
Minw J GLOBAL TR[oE
held either consistent or inconsistent with the Fund Agreement
for Article VIII purposes, depending on whether the IMF is in-
volved in the particular restructuring.
4. Summary
Based on the foregoing discussion, Article VIII, section 2(b)
of the Fund Agreement provides a basis whereby a sovereign
debtor that has sought the involvement of the IMF in its debt
problems may defend against lawsuits by recalcitrant creditors
seeking to challenge a consensual restructuring. The rule of
broad construction applicable to treaties, the overarching eco-
nomic policies of the Fund Agreement, the indisputable inade-
quacies of the text, and the evolutionary process through which
the meaning of the Agreement has come to be understood all
support the proposed interpretation and application of the Fund
Agreement to LDC debt litigation. To the extent that certain
U.S. precedents have adopted the narrow definition of exchange
contracts, and therefore pose an obstacle to the application of
Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement as proposed
here, a reconsideration is in order in light of the experience of
courts of other IMF member nations and the unequivocal stance
Sir Gold and other experts take on the issue. Moreover, courts
should avail themselves of the opportunity to ascertain or ac-
tively seek out the IMF's views and accord them controlling
weight so as to promote uniformity of interpretation and appli-
cation of the Fund Agreement to this problem.
B. ARTICLE VIII, SECTION 2(b) SHOULD NOT APPLY IN CASES
WHERE THE LDC HAS RESTRUCTURED ExTERNAL DEBT (OR
OTHERWISE REPUDIATED ITS OBLIGATIONS) AND THE IMF IS
EITHER NOT INVOLVED IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE DEBTOR
NATION OR THE DEBTOR IS PURSUING POLICIES NOT
CONSONANT WITH IMF ADVICE
As discussed in Section II, supra, secondary trading is a
good thing. It serves the needs of creditor banks and encourages
the collection of information on the creditworthiness of debtor
nations. One may argue, as did the Darts in their case against
Brazil, that any prohibition of suits by secondary purchasers to
enforce LDC debt will depress prices, reduce open interest and
thereby reduce liquidity in the market for LDC debt instru-
ments, to the detriment of all concerned. One plausible answer
to this concern is that in the absence of the possibility of quick
nuisance suit payoffs, the price discovery for LDC debt will more
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accurately reflect the likelihood that the LDC will actually pay
its debts. This would be preferable to a situation where the mar-
ket prices of LDC debt impound less relevant information, in-
cluding, for example, noise as to the value of attachable
commercial assets which are present in the putative forum.
Still, the proposed framework would leave undisturbed the
possibility of plaintiff lawsuits, including speculative lawsuits
by secondary purchasers of LDC debt, as a way of giving LDCs
an incentive to seek the involvement of the IMF at earlier stages
of their external debt problems than was the case in the 1970s
and early 1980s. In this way, secondary purchasers and the
plaintiffs bar may actually serve the international financial sys-
tem by prodding LDCs to check the urge to handle debt
problems by "going it alone" with London Club creditors through
new lending and less stringent austerity measures than the IMF
would prescribe. A few million-dollar judgments handed down
by U.S. courts would bring a proud or profligate LDC govern-
ment into the IMF fold more effectively than pressures from
other sources. There is, moreover, little that LDCs can do con-
tractually to avoid enforcement suits. No Western creditors will
lend without a waiver of sovereign immunity and consent to ser-
vice of process. While sharing clauses may align the interests of
the troubled LDC and major creditors, it appears that offshore
banking entities are teflon-coated against such clauses, since
they exist to collect and then evaporate without sharing the
booty. The framework proposed here seeks to find a silver lining
in what is certainly a dark cloud.
There are instructive precedents on point. For example, in
Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola di
Cartago,1 59 the Second Circuit held that in the wake of a unilat-
eral repudiation by Costa Rica of its external debts and subse-
quent negotiation of a refinancing agreement, a single creditor,
after refusing to participate in the refinancing agreement, could
recover on its sub-tranche of debt. The court reversed its prior
holding1 60 after the United States filed a brief stating that
159. 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985).
160. See 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The affirmance of dismissal in
the first Allied Bank case was based on principles of comity and was done in the
mistaken belief that the Costa Rican decrees were consistent with U.S. policy.
It is worth noting that the doctrine of comity might in certain circumstances
achieve the same result as the Article VIII-based framework proposed here. It
is, however, a slippery concept:
Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own terri-
tory to the ... acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but one of prac-
tice, convenience and expediency. Although more than mere courtesy
1997]
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"Costa Rica's attempted unilateral restructuring of private obli-
gations . . . was inconsistent with [the IMF-guided] system of
international cooperation and negotiation and thus inconsistent
with United States policy."16 This result is in complete accord
with the framework proposed here.
The result in Libra Bank162 is consistent with this paper,
except insofar as it adopts the narrow view of exchange con-
tracts. In granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment,
Chief Judge Motley made four basic holdings. First, the act of
state doctrine did not shield a Costa Rican government decree
suspending performance of commercial debt agreements from
judicial scrutiny by a U.S. court even where the agreement pro-
vided an express waiver of sovereign immunity. 163 Second,
and accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an imperative
or obligation.... Comity should be withheld only when its acceptance
would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation being
called on to give it effect.
Somportex Ltd v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir.
1971).
By contrast, Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement does provide a
rule of law and, furthermore, prohibits members from refusing to give effect to
the exchange control regulations on the grounds that doing so would be con-
trary to the ordre public of the forum. See MANN, supra note 93, at 375.
161. 757 F.2d at 519.
162. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
163. This article does not take issue with this aspect of the Libra Bank hold-
ing and, indeed, is in agreement that the act of state doctrine, under which
courts will not examine the acts of a foreign state done within its own territory
so as to avoid vexing the conduct of diplomatic relations with that country, is
inapplicable. This doctrine is essentially irrelevant to lawsuits to enforce com-
mercial debt obligations payable outside the LDC (as all or most are). Thus,
since the terms of the debt agreement in Libra Bank track the paradigm case
discussed above in Part II, the following language in Chief Judge Motley's opin-
ion is applicable to those LDC debt agreements within the scope of this paper:
[Wihere a foreign government contracts to repay a debt [in dollars] in
New York City, consents to the jurisdiction of our courts, waives its
sovereign immunity with respect to legal proceedings concerning that
debt, and continues to maintain considerable assets in this nation, it
can hardly be said that this court's judgment shall frustrate the foreign
state's reasonable expectation of dominion over the legal rights in-
volved so as to vex our amicable relations with that foreign nation.
[Thus the] exercise of (this court's] judicial power is appropriate [and]
fully consistent with the proper distribution of functions . . . between
the judicial and political branches of the government on matters bear-
ing on foreign affairs'....
570 F. Supp at 884.
[Argument based on the Bretton Woods Agreement is.. . distinct from
... arguments based upon the act of state doctrine .... The argument
that the nonenforcement of the loan agreement is dictated by a positive
law.., is entirely distinct from the argument that a doctrine ofjudicial
abstention bars review of the decrees.... A commentator has also ar-
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under the narrow interpretation of the phrase "exchange con-
tracts," Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement did not
bar judgment in favor of the plaintiff.164 Third, even if section
2(b) did apply, the "defendant has submitted no authority for its
view that a contract, valid and enforceable when made, may be
rendered unenforceable by an intervening currency regula-
tion."165 Fourth, Costa Rica did not make an adequate showing
that its decrees were consistent with the Fund Agreement. 166
The court was correct on the first point, the second point should
be overruled, as noted. The third point is misguided, since there
is ample authority to support the position that Article VIH, sec-
tion 2(b) applies to the time performance is sought and not
merely to the time the contract is made.167 The fourth point ac-
cords with other authorities that favor placing the burden of
showing consistency with the Fund Agreement on the defendant
who relies on Article VIII, section 2(b).' 6 8 In other cases similar
to Libra Bank, where the defendant can make no such showing
due to a lack of IMF involvement in its affairs, non-performance
of its debt obligations would not be deemed consistent with the
Fund Agreement, and an enforcement suit would lie under the
proposed framework.
C. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF SuiTs THROUGH
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE VIII TRACKS JUDICIALLY
NOTICEABLE U.S. POLICIES
The briefs filed by the United States in CIBC Bank (the
Dart case) and Allied Bank confirm that the policy of the United
States is to encourage consensual and fiscally responsible solu-
tions to LDC debt problems and to discourage obduracy and uni-
lateralism on the part of both LDC debtors and their creditors.
These policies are further confirmed by the texts and legislative
histories of the International Lending Supervision and SEED
Acts.
Ironically, despite the clarity with which these policies have
been articulated, courts are hamstrung in that they may not
gued that Article VIII, section 2(b) supersedes the act of state
doctrine."
Id. at 896-97 n.1 (citing Williams, supra note 89, at 387-94).
164. Id. at 900.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 901.
167. See, e.g., Perutz, 304 N.Y. at 533; see also Williams, supra note 89, at
364.
168. See, e.g., GOLD, supra note 97, at 334.
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freely take notice of and respond to such policies when applying
Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement. The reason is
that in making the Fund Agreement part of its domestic law, a
member nation and its judiciary undertake not to refuse recogni-
tion of another member's exchange control regulations on the
ground that such controls are contrary to the public policy (ordre
public) of the forum. 169 In aligning the response of U.S. courts
to LDC debt enforcement suits with the policies of the IMF, the
proposed co-opt of Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Fund Agree-
ment will lead to judicial outcomes that track evolving U.S. poli-
cies in this field.
D. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF PLAINTIFF SUITS MAINTAINS
THE TRADITIONAL SUPERVISORY ROLE OF THE IMF
WHILE ENCOURAGING LDCs To DEAL WITH DEBT
PROBLEMS EARLY.
While further exegesis on the role of the IMF is beyond the
scope of this paper, it is worth noting that implementation of
this framework as a means of dealing with LDC debt problems
and related litigation may be preferable to radical alteration of
the IMF's role in the international system, such as the proposed
"bankruptcy model" which the IMF has recently been en-
couraged to pursue. 170 The bankruptcy model would in practice
require insolvent LDCs to relinquish large measures of sover-
eign control, such as will likely never be politically palatable for
a sitting government. Indeed, the inclination of LDCs to view
the politically humiliating severity of IMF adjustment programs
as a last resort, as did Peru in 1976 and Mexico in 1979-82, will
presumably always be a factor. Moreover, an IMF with expan-
sive bankruptcy court powers will be less accountable to its con-
stituent members and less transparent in its activities.1 71
These considerations counsel in favor of less expansive changes
in the IMF's role.
The framework proposed here can be a valuable element in
forestalling the need for an IMF bankruptcy scheme. The
framework makes constructive use of the waiver of sovereign
169. MANN, supra note 93, at 375 (citations omitted).
170. See, e.g., George Graham, IMF Crisis Plan Draws on Mexican Lesson,
FiN. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1995, at 8 ("Some countries have argued that the IMF should
consider building... a sort of international bankruptcy court, where sovereign
debtors could negotiate orderly debt workouts with their creditors.").
171. See George P. Schultz, Stigler Lecture, The University of Chicago (Apr.
9, 1996) (increases in the overt power of international financial institutions re-
sult in proportional decreases in the accountability of such institutions).
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immunity that is a part of every LDC commercial debt agree-
ment and leverages it to the benefit of the London Club and
LDCs. Once courts apply this framework to a fair number of live
controversies and the word gets out, LDCs will have incentive to
avoid unilateral repudiations of their obligations, on the one
hand, and be encouraged to seek out the IMF early in their ef-
forts to manage external debt problems, on the other, without
forcing LDCs to relinquish more sovereign control than they do
currently.
CONCLUSION
Suits by obdurate private LDC creditors, especially specula-
tive secondary purchasers, will be increasingly common and
troubling in the wake of the Darts' success. Small numbers of
creditors will essentially seek to free ride off the losses of major
creditors by getting in the way of restructuring efforts between
LDCs and their commercial creditors. As this paper has demon-
strated, courts faced with such actions may discourage rank
profiteering, enhance the supervisory role of the IMF, and reach
results which are in accord with U.S. policies by applying Article
VIII, section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement in the manner pro-
posed here. The aim is simply to weed out cases against LDCs
that are managing their affairs in accord with IMF policies.
The framework espoused in this paper would maintain the
IMF's latitude in recommending the most efficacious adjust-
ments and at the same time, would leave LDC governments
more able to justify IMF-prescribed belt tightening by pointing
to the clear necessity of avoiding suits by malcontent creditors.
In this way, application of Article VIII, section 2(b) of the Fund
Agreement to enforcement suits by creditors will encourage
global cooperation and, hopefully, reduce "the dynamic instabil-
ity inherent in the game as currently played." 172
172. See B. J. Cohen, LDC Debt: Towards a Genuinely Cooperative Solution,
in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 174, 191 (Hamouda
et al. eds., 1990) (advocating a new "International Debt Restructuring Agency,"
possibly within the IMF, and presenting arguments both for and against the
interposition of a "new player in a game where the old players already know all
the rules").
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